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Evidence on the Lack of Separation 
Between Business and Personal Risks 
Among Small Businesses
James S. Ang 
James Wuh Lin 
Floyd Tyler
Small business researchers conjecture that there is little separation between 
business and personal risks among small businesses. Personal assets and 
wealth can be subject to business risks in the form of an implicit or explicit 
claim depending on the organizational form and whether personal 
commitments are pledged by owners. The choice of organizational form can 
be considered a mechanism to increase the degree of separation; however, 
lenders' requirements for personal commitments mitigate the benefits of 
limited liability provisions. This paper examines the role of personal 
collateral and personal guarantees in augmenting implicit claims on business 
and personal assets with explicit claims on personal assets and personal 
wealth. We document the degree of non-separation of business and personal 
risks for 692 firms. Our results suggests that small business owners have a 
significant incidence of personal assets and wealth pledged for business loans, 
even for organizational forms such as S-corporations and C-corporations 
with hmited legal liability. These results confirm the conjecture that there is a 
lack of separation between business and personal risks. The lack of separation 
of business and personal risks has important policy implications for the 
borrowing patterns and access to credit markets of small businesses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Small business researchers conjecture that there is little separation of the 
business and personal risks associated with small business ownership. 
Personal assets can be subject to business risks in the form of an implicit 
or explicit claim on personal assets depending on the organizational
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form and whether a personal commitment has been pledged. For 
example, if a financial institution grants an unsecured loan to a business, 
the financial institution has an implicit claim on all assets of the business. 
By pledging business collateral to obtain the loan, the business owner 
augments the implicit claim on all business assets with an explicit claim 
on a business asset. Similarly, pledging personal assets as collateral 
(personal guarantees) commits the specific assets (personal wealth) of 
the owner. This paper examines the extent small business owners use 
personal collateral and personal guarantees to augment implicit claims 
on business and/or personal assets with explicit claims on personal assets 
and personal wealth. It empirically investigates the degree of non­
separation of business and personal risks.
Personal collateral and personal guarantees have similar implications 
for the nature of bank claims. They are a means to enhance credit via 
other collateralization. Since there is a difference in the stated legal 
liability for organizational forms, the incidence of personal commitments 
(i.e., personal collateral and/or personal guarantees) is examined for each 
organizational form. Sole proprietorships and partnerships have 
unlimited business and personal liability. In the absence of personal 
commitments, owners are subject to an implicit claim on all business 
assets and personal wealth. Under non-corporate organizational forms, 
the pledging of personal collateral augments the implicit claim on all 
personal wealth with an explicit claim on a personal asset. Although it 
does not reduce the size of the implicit claim on personal wealth, 
pledging personal collateral adds an explicit claim on a personal asset. 
The pledging of a personal guarantee augments the implicit claim on all 
personal assets and wealth with an explicit claim on all personal wealth 
including future income. Personal collateral requirements for non­
corporate organizational forms may appear redundant; however, the 
pledging of personal assets may provide the lender with greater ability to 
prevent asset disposition or a reduction in asset values.
Under corporate organizational forms, the pledging of personal 
commitments generates explicit claims on personal assets and/or wealth. 
The pledging of personal collateral reduces the effectiveness of limited 
liability protection under corporate organizational forms. Personal assets 
are no longer separated from business assets and lenders’ claims fall 
explicitly on the owners, thus allowing lenders to pierce the corporate veil.
The analysis of the lack of separation between business and personzil 
risks is a unique contribution for several reasons.
1. This analysis allows small business researchers to complete their 
understanding of the total risks faced by owners of small businesses.
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These risks of small business ownership may extend beyond business 
failure and could result in personal ruin. Thus, theoretical models of 
corporate finance theory need to accommodate a more complicated 
limited liability condition.
2. It proposes a partial explanation of credit rationing by lenders. 
Bernanke and Lown (1992) argue that the decline in bank lending in the 
early 1990s (i.e., credit crunch of 1990s) may have been related to a 
deterioration in the quality of business collateral offered by firms seeking 
bank credit or an increase in the amount or quality of business collateral 
demanded by banks. Our result extends this explanation confirming that 
in the absence of available business collateral, a substantial proportion of 
small business owners are required to pledge personal commitments to 
obtain business loans. Personal commitments by lenders can be personal 
collateral and/or personal guarantees. A personal guarantee differs from 
personal collateral in that a personal guarantee provides an explicit 
claim on the personal wealth of the owner, rather than an explicit claim 
on a personal asset. A lender’s ability to seek repayment from an owner 
is not limited to personal assets, but also includes the current wealth and 
future income of the owner. Our extension of Bernanke and Lown may 
help explain why some business owners, who lack the personal assets and 
wealth to provide personal commitments, are more likely to experience 
business credit rationing. Thus, models of loan markets should 
incorporate the equilibrium supply of personal commitments.
3. It may help explain the relationship between personal 
commitments and firm characteristics such as profitability and leverage. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the lack of 
separation between business and personal risks among small businesses, 
which may have important theoretical and policy implications on models 
of corporate finance and the audit market.
II. SCOPE
The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical support for the widely 
accepted conjecture that there is a lack of separation between business 
and personal risks among small businesses. We examine the extent 
personal real estate, other personal assets, and personal guarantees 
pledged for business loans, while increasing the amount of assets 
financed and the firm’s leverage ratio. The pledging of personal 
commitments increases the personal risks of business ownership. Higher 
personal commitment requirements subject small business owners to the 
risks of simultaneous business and personal bankruptcies. This paper
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documents the personal risks among small businesses for different 
organizational forms.
Organizational form may affect the willingness or ability of business 
owners to make personal commitments, in addition to other factors such 
as tax planning, resolution of agency problems, etc. The choice of 
organizational form such as corporations can be considered a mechanism 
to increase the degree of separation between business and personal risks. 
Sole proprietorships and partnerships do not have legal protection from 
unlimited liability in the case of business failure. These organizational 
forms are normally expected to experience a lower degree of separation 
between business and personal risks than corporations. On the other 
hand, pledging personal collateral weakens the limited liability 
protection of the corporate form, thus increasing the personal risks of 
the business ownership. Personal guarantees further weaken the limited 
liability protection of corporate organizational forms since a personal 
guarantee pledges current wealth and future incomes to obtain a business 
loan.
Prior literature examined several factors related to the incidence of 
business collateral which may also be related to the incidence of personal 
commitments within organizational forms. Firm size, debt ratio, and firm 
profitability were used to investigate the relation between firm 
characteristics and personal commitments. The significance of each 
factor was examined for each organizational form to allow for more 
insightful analyses.
We also examine an agency explanation for the incidence of personal 
commitments across organizational forms. Partnerships are predicted to 
have a lower incidence of personal commitments by individual partners 
than the other organizational forms due to the higher potential agency 
problems betvveen partners. The actions of an individual partner can 
place the personal assets and wealth of all other partners at risks. This 
potential agency problem leads to greater personal risks in the 
partnership form. Due to unequal risk sharing and firee-riding among 
partners, each of the partners will be less inclined to pledge personal 
collateral or personal guarantees for business loans. Partners will want to 
reserve the option to mitigate the agency-related actions of other 
partners by retaining the right to withhold personal assets from the 
partnership via asset disposal or assignment. The pledging of personal 
assets on behalf of the partnership would eliminate this means of 
protection from other partners. Our paper is organized as follows. 
Section III outlines the relevant literature. Section IV discusses the
200 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 4(2/3) 1995
NSSBF data and our methodology. Section V presents the results. 
Section VI concludes.
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III. LITERATURE
Many small businesses pledge business collateral for debt financing. 
Berger and Udell (1990) report that two-thirds of all commercial bank 
loans are extended on a secured basis. The National Federation of 
Independent Businesses (NFIB) reports that 60 percent of firms with 
commercial bank loans pledge business collateral as security for the loan 
agreement. The NFIB also reports that some form of collateral is 
pledged for 80 percent of the dollar volume of small business loans. 
Evidence suggests that several factors affect business collateralization. 
Leeth and Scott (1989) find seven factors influencing the use of business 
collateral: probability of default, firm size, asset specialization, loan 
maturity, loan size, real risk-free interest rate, and the legal environment. 
They find that the incidence of debt secured by business collateral 
among small businesses is direcdy related to their probability of default 
and inversely related to the loan size, loan maturity, and the 
marketability of assets.
Several theories have attempted to explain the use of business 
collateral among larger firms (see Scott, 1977; Smith & Warner, 1979; 
Stulz & Johnson, 1985, on limited liability theory). Chan and Kanatas 
(1985) suggest a theory that predicts collateral usage based on loan size, 
loan maturity, «md company size. Leeth and Scott (1989) proposes an 
agency explanation that the business collateral provision lowers a firm’s 
total cost of debt in three ways: 1) reduces incentives for asset 
substitution by managers; 2) reduces potential foreclosure costs; and 3) 
mitigates the underinvestment problem.
Business collateral usage varies across firm and owner characteristics. 
Firm size is inversely related to collateral usage. Altman, Haldeman, and 
Narayanan (1977) suggest that collateral may reduce debt expenses more 
for smaller firms because of their higher probability of bankmptcy. None 
of these studies examines personal collateral or personal guarantees 
pledged for business loans. A more detailed analysis of personal 
commitments can provide additional insight into small business lending.
The existing literature on small business collateral has left personal 
collateral usage largely unexplored. Our paper differs from the existing 
business collateral literature in several ways. First, we document the 
incidence of personal commitments by small business owners to 
investigate the lack of separation of business and personal risks. Previous
measures of business risks in earlier studies have excluded the usage of 
personal collateral and personal guarantees, thus underestimating its 
true magnitude. Second, we examine whether some of the factors that 
are related to business collateral are also related to personal 
commitments.
Third, we examine an agency explanation of the incidence of 
personal risks across organizational forms. The agency explanation 
predicts that partnerships will have a lower incidence of personal 
commitments than other organizational forms due to higher potential 
agency problems between partners. First, partners have an unlimited 
personal liability for business risks including the activities of the other 
partners. In a partnership, business partners have a greater ability to 
dispose, pledge for personal use, or sell personal assets. If the personal 
assets remain unencumbered, partners can escape the onus of unlimited 
liability. Pledging these assets for business loans would remove ownership 
rights from the asset’s owners. Another problem involves the unequal risk 
exposure and free-riding related to which partner should pledge 
personal assets among business partners. The pledging of personal 
commitments by one partner could lead to adverse incentives for other 
partners to take greater business risks at the expense of the partner(s) 
pledging personal assets. Thus, the participation in a partnership results 
in implicit claims on the business assets and the personal assets and 
wealth of all partners. By pledging personal collateral, partners augment 
the general claim on personal assets and wealth with a specific claim on 
personal assets. Likewise, partners who pledge a personal guarantee 
augment the general claim on all partners’ personal assets and wealth 
with a specific claim on his or her personal wealth.
Sole proprietorships are not subject to the agency problems 
associated with the partnership form. Pledging of personal 
commitments is related to the risk perception and aversion of the 
lender and the owner’s perception of the business opportunity. The 
pledging of personal assets by sole proprietorship may appear 
redundant, except where there is a need to make the lender’s claim on 
personal wealth explicit. However, the personal commitment is a 
means of credit enhancement to the lender in some cases. We also 
provide evidence on the extent personal collateral and guarantees are 
committed by small business corporations whose owners are protected 
from business losses. Using the NSSBF data, we are able to examine 
this explanation in a meaningful way. Our paper fills these important 
gaps in the literature.
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IV. METHOD
One reason for the paucity of empirical work on personal risks of 
business ownership is the lack of available data on personal commitments 
for business loans. Recently, a source of data has been collected which 
contains information on personal commitments pledged for business 
loans. The data is obtained from the National Survey of Small Business 
Finances conducted by the Research Triangle Institute jointly sponsored 
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Small 
Business Administration. The survey was conducted from October 1988 
March 1989. The survey focuses on non-financial, non-agriculture small 
businesses (less than 500 employees) that were operating as of December, 
1987. Firms involved in the agriculture, forestry, and fishing industry; 
finance and insurance underwriting; or real estate investment trusts were 
excluded from the survey. Financial data was collected only for the last 
fiscal year. The survey consists of 3,404 firms— 1,875 corporations, 1,529 
partnerships and sole proprietorships. The survey contains several 
measures of business collateral and personal commitments.
The business collateral pledged are inventory and accounts 
receivable, equipment, and business real estate. Personal real estate, 
other personal assets, and personal guarantees are the three observed 
forms of personzJ commitments. The sample contains 692 firms with 
usable responses, regarding the relevant items of interest. It is note 
worthy that the data on personal commitments are reported as 
dichotomous variables, which are recorded as personal commitments 
pledged if any of the three measures of personal commitments are 
pledged. The organizational form breakdown for the usable sample is as 
follows: 118 sole proprietorships, 51 partnerships, 121 5-corporations 
and 402 C-corporations.
To conduct our analyses, we examine the incidence of personal 
commitments by organizational form and one of the following variables: 
firm size, profitability, and leverage ratio. The sample partitioning allows 
us to examine the incidence of personal commitments within 
organizational forms.
V. RESULTS
Panel A of Table 1 depicts the relation between the incidence of personal 
commitments and organizational forms. Sixty-nine percent of the firms 
(478/692) pledged some form of personal commitment for a business 
loan. To fixrther investigate these results, the sample is partitioned by
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organizational form. Sole proprietorships and partnerships have similar 
incidences of personal commitments, 54.6 percent and 54.1 percent 
respectively. This result is consistent with the lack of separation of 
business and personal risks. 5-corporations have the highest incidence of 
personal commitments pledged at 72.9 percent, while 58.9 percent of C- 
corporations pledge some form of personal commitment. The lower level 
of personal commitments for partnerships relative to corporations is 
consistent with our agency explanation. The higher proportion of 
personal commitment for corporations is evidence of a weakening of 
limited liability provisions for small businesses, which suggests that not 
all corporations can claim protection from the limited liability provision.
Panel B reports the incidence of each form of personal commitment 
for different organizational forms. Personal guarantees are the most
Table 1






Proprietorships Partnerships S-Corporations C-Corporations
Business Loans with 54.6% 54.1% 72.9% 58.9%
personal commitment (74) (34) (98) (272)
Business Loans w/o 45.4% 45.9% 27.1% 41.1%
personal commitment (44) (17) (23) (130)
Sample Size 100% 100% 100% 100%
(118) (51) (121) (402)
Notes: The personal commitment variables are personal real estate, other personal assets, and 
personal guarantees.
Table 1
Breakdown of Personal Commitments for Business Loans
Panel B
Sole
proprietorships Partnerships S-corporations C-corporations
Personal real estate 81.4% 75% 100% 82.9%
(35/43) (3/4) (15/15) (34/41)
Other personal assets 16.3% 10.8% 18.8% 14.2%
(15/92) (4/37) (18/85) (44/309)
Personal guarantee 83% 97% 100% 97.1%
(39/47) (32/33) (81/81) (235/242)
Notes: The number of firms used to calculate the percentages are reported in parentheses. The 
numerator is the number of firms which pledged some form of personal commitment. The 
denominator is the total number of firms in each cell with usable, non-missing responses.
common form of personal commitment for all organizational forms, 
followed by personal real estate. The larger number of firms pledging 
personal real estate than ‘other personal assets’ may be explained by 
lenders’ preferences for real estate as personal collateral. If a loan default 
occurs, lenders are more likely to take possession of personal real estate 
than many other personal assets which could be dissipated or hidden 
more quickly. The general lack of liquidity of personal real estate makes 
it easier to monitor compared to other personal assets such as furniture 
or jewelry.
Partnerships have a lower incidence of personal real estate and other 
personal assets than the other organizational forms, except for personal 
guarantees. These results are consistent with our agency explanation. 
Individual partners are less likely to pledge personal commitments to 
secure business loans.
Large difierences in personal commitments between organizational 
forms are mosdy limited to the personal real estate category among 
corporations. The difference between the corporate forms may have an 
agency explanation. One could argue that 5-corporations are more 
likely to have a smaller number of shareholders consisting of family and 
friends, while C-corporations may have larger numbers of shareholders 
who are linked by business ties only. The nature of these ties may infer 
that owners, who are family members, may be more likely to pledge 
personal commitments. Overall, these results support our claim that 
limited liability protection is severely reduced for corporations. This 
evidence strongly suggests that personal risks of small business ownership 
extend beyond business risks and the risks of losing specific personal 
assets to the current and future wealth of small business owners.
Table 2 shows the relation between firm size and the incidence of 
personal commitments for different organizational forms. The sample is 
partitioned into the following size categories based upon total assets: less 
than $100,000, $100,000-$500,000, and $500,000 or greater. With the 
exception of partnerships, the demand for personal commitments by 
lenders decreases as firm size increases. There is nearly a 20 percentage 
point difference in the incidence of personal commitments between the 
smallest and largest size categories of sole proprietorships. The inverse 
relation between the incidence of personal commitments and firm size 
confirms results found in previous studies of business collateral and firm 
size.
These results for firm size could be consistent with several 
explanations.
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Table 2
Incidence of Personal Commitments Pledged for 




Proprietorships Partnerships S-Corporations C-Corporations
Smallest 69.6% 56.3% 100% 82.8%
(< $100,000) (39/56) (9/16) (11/11) (24/29)
Medium 58.3% 62.5% 80.6% 67.2%
($100,000-500,000) (28/48) (10/16) (29/36) (80/119)
Largest 50% 78.9% 78.4% 66.1%
(> $500,000) (7/14) (15/19) (58/74) (168/254)
Notes: The percentages reflect the incidence of personal commitments for each cell. The 
numerator is the number of firms in each cell which pledged some form of personal 
commitment. The denominator is the total number of firms in each cell with usable, non­
missing responses.
1. It may be increasingly difficult for some owners to willingly 
pledge personal assets as the number of investors increases.
2. Size could be a reflection of prior success and thus, there may be 
lower requirements for personal commitments by lenders to obtain a 
business loan.
3. The type of small business may be related to size. Manufacturing 
and mining firms are larger and have more tangible assets, while service 
firms are smaller and have fewer fixed assets available for collateral.
4. Larger firms may have more fixed business assets which can be 
pledged as business collateral, while smaller firms may have less business 
collateral. Lenders would require similar levels of personal commitments 
from smaller businesses. The significant difference in the incidence of 
personal commitments based upon firm size provides evidence of the 
lack of separation of total risks that is most acute in the smallest of small 
businesses. Large non-financial firms tend to be corporations and are 
assumed to possess a greater degree of separation of business and 
personal risks. Yet, a non-negligible amount of personal risks still exists 
among small business corporations, thus reducing the benefits of limited 
liability protection. Thus, many small business owners are either required 
to or voluntarily pledge personal assets and wealth to supplement 
business collateral in order to obtain credit financing.
Table 3 depicts the relation betiveen leverage ratio and the incidence 
of personal commitments for different organizational forms. Leverage 
ratio is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. The sample is 
partitioned based upon three leverage categories: less than 15 percent, 
15-40 percent, and greater than 40 percent. Firms with lower leverage
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Table 3




Proprietorships Partnerships S-Corporations C-Corporations
Low 50% 75% 80% 50%
(LR < 15%) (9/18) (3/4) (4/5) (5/10)
Medium 67.9% 100% 72.2% 76.3%
(15 % < LR < 40%) (19/28) (6/6) (13/18) (45/59)
High 64.7% 57.9% 83.3% 68.1%
(LR > 40%) (44/68) (22/38) (75/90) (213/313)
Notes: The number of firms used to calculate the percentages are reported in parentheses. The 
numerator is the number of firms in each cell which pledge some form of personal 
commitment. The denominator is the total number of firms in each cell with usable, non­
missing responses.
Table 4




Proprietorships Partnerships S-Corporations C-Corporations
Profitable 63.3% 63.2% 76.6% 67.2%
(50/79) (24/38) (59/77) (178/265)
Unprofitable 65% 80% 89.2% 69.1%
(13/20) (4/5) (33/37) (67/97)
Notes: The number of firms used to calculate the percentages are reported in parentheses. The 
numerator is the number of firms which provided some form of personal commitment. The 
denominator is the total number of firms with usable, non-missing responses.
ratios have lower incidences of personal commitments, except for 
partnerships. One explanation is that leverage is constrained by the 
ability or willingness of owners to make personal commitments. Smaller 
businesses do not have the supply of unencumbered personal assets or 
sufficient personal wealth to secure higher levels of leverage. Owners of 
proprietorships (corporations) with smaller (larger) personal assets may 
also have fewer (more) other sources of funds and thus desiring more 
credit financing.
Table 4 reports the relation between profitability and the incidence 
of personal commitments for different organizational forms. The sample 
is partitioned into two profitability categories; non-negative profits and 
negative profits. Profits are measured as earnings before taxes. Sole 
proprietorships and C-corporations reflect little disparit)  ^ in the
differences in personal commitments, while partnerships and S- 
corporations have greater disparity. There is an inverse relationship 
between profitability and personal commitments. The results for 
partnerships and corporations suggest that: 1) profitable firms are able 
to refuse a lender’s demand for more personal commitments when the 
firm is doing well or can use internal funds generated from profitability 
to obtain financing or 2) owners of unprofitable firms, who possess 
favorable asymmetric information or are more optimistic, are willing to 
pledge personal assets or wealth. Thus, increasing the simultaneous 
occurrence of business ruin and personal ruin when the firms are not 
doing well. Our results find evidence that the total risk of small business 
ownership is greater than previously presumed for noncorporate as well 
as corporate organizational forms.
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The results suggests that personal commitments are an important 
component of small business lending. The incidence of personal 
commitments is related to organizational form, firm size, profitability, 
and leverage ratios. Firm size is inversely related to the incidence of 
personal commitments for sole proprietorships and corporations. Larger 
firms have a greater degree of separation of business and personal risks 
and thus lower personal commitments. The results for profitability and 
leverage are consistent with this explanation. We find empirical support 
for an agency explanation of personal commitments among 
organizational forms. Partnerships have the lowest incidence of personal 
commitments among organizational forms. In sum, we find empirical 
evidence supporting the conjecture that there is a lack of separation of 
business and personal risks among most small businesses.
Small businesses depend primarily on banks for debt financing. 
Popast (1986) finds that the small firms’ bank financing accounts for 20- 
30 percent of their total debt and a larger proportion of secured debt. 
Personal collateralization may allow financial institutions to finance 
more riskier projects on the margin than they would in its absence. 
Given this dependence on credit financing, corporations are faced with a 
difficult dilemma with respect to minimizing the personal risks of 
business ownership and obtaining credit financing. Owners of 
corporations are required to pledge personal commitments, which 
forfeits the limited liability protection of their organization structure. 
Prior to this paper, there was no empirical evidence of the personal risks 
of small business ownership. The personal risks are substantial for all
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organizational forms and should be included when examining business 
risks.
There are important poliq: implications for the finding of a lack of 
separation of personal and business risks in small businesses.
1. An underinvestment problem could exists if risk averse small 
business owners become less willing to borrow funds to be 
supported by personal assets and wealth to undertake positive net 
present value projects. Economic development and growth in 
smaller communities where owners may have undiversified 
personal portfolios may be restrained since these projects must be 
forgone. A high incidence of lenders requiring personal collateral 
and guarantees may severely reduce personal diversification of 
small business owners.
2. It may help explain differences in the availability of credit 
financing among seemingly similar small businesses. TTie fact that 
some owners are more willing and/or able to pledge personal 
collateral and personal guarantees implies that business owners 
without the ability to provide them may be rationed credit by 
financial institutions. Institutions are requiring small business 
owners to pledge personal assets and wealth. Thus, in modeling 
the loan function of small businesses, personal commitments 
must be included.
3. The availability of personal commitments could enable small 
businesses to obtain debt financing even in the presence of 
asymmetric information between owners and lenders. Thus, one 
could argue that the ability and willingness of owners to pledge 
personal commitments as a signal can circumvent the effects of 
asymmetric information in credit markets.
4. Our findings also have important implications for finance theory 
including capital structure, agency costs, and risk aversion/ 
bankmptcy. Leverage levels for small businesses are overstated 
since the relevant total asset base should include business and 
personal assets. Theories of leverage should encompass personal 
risks to accurately reflect the total risks of leverage for small 
business. Empirical attempts to explain small business leverage 
are mis-specified if personal risks are not incorporated. Agency- 
related issues such as asset substitution and claim dilution must 
be expanded to incorporate personal assets. The threat of 
bankruptcy becomes more ominous since not only the business 
assets are vulnerable, but so are personal assets.
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